

Approved For Release 2001/03/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R006100060

INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY Rumania

CONFIDENTIAL

CD NO

SUBJECT Background of the Independant Social-Democratic
Party; Activities of Rumanian Socialists
Abroad

DATE DISTR. 26 OCT 50

NO. OF PAGES 8

PLACE
ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF
INFO.

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

25X1A

25X1X

1. "Striving to remake its cadres and to increase its ranks, after more than six years of enforced clandestine existence, the leadership of the Rumanian Social-Democratic Party forgave and readmitted to membership a number of former members who had betrayed both Party discipline and the Party line, joining various governments of a dictatorial or neo-fascist character during the times of adversity when the Socialist Party had been officially dissolved. Such grave derelictions, offending both Socialist and democratic ideas, were interpreted as personal gestures of opportunism. With the indulgence that characterizes our traditions, we again received in our midst these former comrades.
2. "This leniency developed later to have been a serious mistake. Opportunists and people of no character were to create a series of internal difficulties to the Party, undermining coherence and unity. More than that, some of these people, either seduced by Communist offers or giving in to blackmail on account of their vulnerable record, became Communist tools, succeeding in paralyzing our tactical moves, and even frustrating them altogether.
3. "Realizing the lack of loyalty of the Communist Party in this collaboration in the government - which was soon to take the form of a veritable persecution against us - the Party's leadership decided that we should retire from the government. The issue was put before the Executive Committee by the president of the Party, Constantin Titel Petrescu, who asked our members in the coalition government to resign. He was, however, voted down by those comrades already referred to above.
4. "In Rumania, the Socialist movement and the trade union movement had followed parallel courses that almost amounted to identity. Unlike other countries, the distinction between them was not evident; often the same men held key positions in both organizations. Hence the Communists first began exercising their terror against the trade union movement, it being their purpose at that time to conceal their activities against our Party which was collaborating with them in the government. As the result, Socialists who were members of factory committees and refused to join the Communist Party or who refused to obey the Communist minority in these

STATE		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION	
ARMY		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR		<input type="checkbox"/>	FBI			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document is hereby regraded to **CONFIDENTIAL** in accordance with the letter of 16 October 1978 from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Archivist of the United States.

Next Review Date: 2008

Approved For Release 2001/03/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R006100060006-6

committees were arrested and personally molested. Later the Communist dissolved the elected plant committees and appointed provisional commissions, or else held elections under the threat of Communist Party shock squads, of the police, and, in some instances, of the Soviet occupation troops. It is hardly necessary to add that such elections as were held were not secret.

5. "On the other hand, Socialist officials and employees in public offices were deprived of the right to sign any papers that might have threatened Communist domination. Administrators of various enterprises were arrested under all sorts of transparent pretexts. While being held for investigations that never reached any conclusion and were constantly delayed, these people were replaced by members of the Communist Party.
6. "The chairman of our more powerful district organizations were likewise arrested and often held for months at a time without being brought into court or indicted for any offense.
7. "Faced with this situation, many of our leaders, headed by our president Titel Petrescu, decided to fight back openly, both against the Communists and against their tools within our Party. The occasion arose when the Communists offered us to put up joint lists of candidates for the forthcoming parliamentary elections. We rejected this offer, following a majority vote to this effect in the Party meeting of December, 1945.
8. "The Communist agents within our ranks, afraid of the consequences and of the effect their failure to prevent this vote might have upon themselves, proposed an amendment - which was voted - to the effect that this decision should be reconsidered on the eve of the elections for a final resolution to be taken in accordance with any special circumstances that might intervene in the meantime. This resulted in the Party Congress of 10 March, 1946.
9. "Preparations for the Congress were marked by a feverish activity in both camps. Those in favor of the joint electoral lists, aided by the Communist Party itself, resorted to every means to influence the delegates, beginning with bribery and ending with intimidation.
10. "The issues before us were:
 - a. Participation in joint lists. This position was upheld with the arguments that
 - 1) labor unity would be thereby maintained; and
 - 2) the anti-Bourgeois front would be realized.
 - b. Entering a separate list of candidates. This was supported by the following arguments:
 - 1) an election on a separate list would permit the true strength of the two labor parties to appear;
 - 2) following the results of the elections, we could demand a more adequate representation in the coalition government;
 - 3) it would mark our open disassociation from the unpopular Communist activities in the government;
 - 4) the Party's independence would thereby be saved.
11. "The Bureau of the Congress, which included members in favor of separate lists but which later proved to have played into the hands of the Communists, proceeded to annul the mandates of delegates thought to favor the thesis of Titel Petrescu.

12. "Tudor Ionescu, then Minister of Mines and Petroleum, read to the Congress a letter that was intended to compromise Titel Petrescu. This letter was later proven to be false. In this atmosphere of tension, the Communists proposed that the resolutions before the Congress be voted upon by a show of hands. The separatists insisted on a secret vote, both to maintain the proper procedure and to prevent the Communists from identifying their foes too easily. Apprehension was rife among the delegates. The Communist police was present in the building where the meeting was being held, while Soviet tanks happened to be maneuvering in the nearby streets. Finally, in the midst of great commotion, the Bureau of the Congress decided that voting would be carried out openly. Thereupon, in sign of protest, Titel Petrescu together with most of the delegates left the hall. Those who remained voted in favor of joint lists with the Communist Party. Among these latter were Lotar Radacanu, Stefan Voitec, Tudor Ionescu, Serban Voinea, and Eftimie Gherman. The schism in the Party has become an accomplished fact.
13. "On 9 May 1946, those who had followed the initiative of Titel Petrescu met in a Congress at the Amicitia hall, where the Independent Social-Democrat Party was formed. As for the masses, they had remained alongside their true leaders throughout. A detachment of troops under the command of a major who was a military judge came, on orders from Teohar Georgescu, Minister of the Interior, to arrest us while the Congress was in progress. Before that, however, the motion to constitute the new independent Party had been voted and carried. We were set free shortly thereafter, and the Congress was able to continue its work elsewhere, establishing the statutes and program of the Party.
14. "Our act of defiance and independence gained us, in spite of the Soviet occupation, the unanimous approval of Rumanian public opinion, and strengthened our position with the people, especially the workers. But obviously, on the other hand, the fury of the Communists, and especially of our former comrades who continued to collaborate with them, was more bitter than ever. Systematic persecution began without delay. Our offices were occupied forcibly, or, when this was not feasible, they were requisitioned by the Ministry of the Interior. We were refused authorization to issue a newspaper. Worst of all, on demand of the Socialists in the government, all state and private employees who were Socialists were required to make written statements as to which faction they approved. Those who declared themselves with the Independents were immediately expelled from the unions to which they belonged, which meant they were deprived of all means of livelihood and lost certain benefits in respect to food rations. And thus, with the complicity of our former comrades, an allegedly Socialist regime showed how it meant to respect the right to work and the right to hold an independent opinion.
15. "Under these conditions, the Independent Social-Democratic Party had to carry on its activities as best it could, countering the persecutions of the regime with the fighting experience gained under former reactionary regimes, strong in the sympathy of the popular masses. Lacking a newspaper of our own, we had to resort to circulars and multigraphed bulletins. Our committees met in secret in the homes of our various district members. Instructions were delivered by trusted messengers. Throughout this time, our Party never ceased informing the delegations of the Western Powers in the Allied Control Commission, as well as Socialist bodies of the West, of the situation. We were given irresponsible assurances from some quarters that the signing of the Peace Treaty would mark an end of these exceptional circumstances, and that everything would return to normal, democratic ways.
16. "But we realized that so long as the Soviet Armies of occupation remained in the country no treaty on earth could change matters. Nevertheless, acting in accordance with the assurances given to us, we went on to prepare for the elections that had been set for 19 November 1946. We had been assured by the representatives of the two Western Allies in the Allied Control Commission that these elections would be truly free, and there was some hope that we would be allowed to exercise such rights as would be ours following the results of these elections.

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

17. "The Independent Social-Democratic Party began its electoral campaign under the worst possible conditions. The Government persisted in its refusal to grant us permission to bring out our own newspaper, alleging the paper shortage, while, at the same time, Communist so-called humorous newspapers flooded the country. We were unable to carry out any effective propaganda, or to compete with the Communists in any way. The other two opposition parties, the National Peasants and National Liberals each had its own paper.
18. "At all courthouses, where the lists of parliamentary candidates had to be deposited, shock squads of the Communists were posted and forcibly prevented entry. Whenever we resorted to violence ourselves and succeeded in posting our lists, those who proposed them were immediately arrested in their homes in the middle of the night and jailed. Socialist employees were dismissed. Some of our candidates disappeared without a trace. Systematically, the organs of the regime refused to inscribe on the lists of voters and candidates all persons suspected of opposing the government. Most candidates were pursued, beaten, injured, and robbed. Moves to prevent certain names from appearing on voting lists were postponed to hearings at dates subsequent to the elections. The offices of certain mayors refused to issue legal certificates required for posting candidates. Agents of the government were issued five to ten voting bulletins each. Our speakers were prevented from reaching the villages. None dared to put up or carry our posters for fear of the police. We were forced to throw them at night into people's yards, helped by students and school children. Our printers were subjected to terror. Independent newspapers saw their every reference to our Party censored and deleted.
19. "During this time the Socialists in the government carried on a furious propaganda accusing us of having sold out to the bourgeoisie and to the imperialists. At their electioneering meetings, the only ones allowed, they assailed us with even greater fury than the Communists. At one such meeting held at Oravitza, the government delegate supervising the proceedings accused Titel Petrescu of having destroyed Socialist unity and of having betrayed the working class. Heading the government's list was Serban Voinea, who was later to preside over the Congress that decided to fuse with the Communist Party.
20. "On the day of the elections, our delegates were refused access to the polls. Much later on that day a small number of them were allowed to enter, but were denied access to the ballot boxes and prevented from witnessing their count. The results of the elections are public knowledge: they were disastrous for the government, in spite of the incredible efforts to thwart the opposition. The local election chairmen resorted to drawing up the results according to orders from the district authorities or as their fantasy directed. The totals were added up at the Ministry of the Interior, where the final results were drawn up to conform with the orders of the Communist head of that Ministry. In this way we were robbed of the heavy vote cast for us, to the satisfaction of our former comrades who were 'in' on the governmental Communist lists.
21. "Immediately after these mock elections, the persecution against us increased in scope and violence. At the same time the Socialists in the government bloc were offered an opportunity to integrate their group with the Communist Party. A congress of their faction was called in October 1947, to decide the issue. It was held in Bucharest under the presidency of Serban Voinea, who had in the meantime been appointed Minister to Bern. In perfect unity, without a protest or objection, without any amendment being proposed the fusion with the Communist Party was voted unanimously. The grave digger of the Party, Serban Voinea, made an impassioned closing speech in praise of the shameful act just concluded, and serenely returned to Switzerland. Thus the Communist agents who had infiltrated our ranks accomplished their mission.
22. "The treatment meted out to our party prevented us from sending emissaries abroad, to contact Western circles and explain the situation in Rumania.
23. "Hence the field was left free for our foes, who were thus able to misrepresent the realities and to deceive the good faith of many in the West.

For instance, the COMISCO gave membership to the Socialist faction that collaborated with the Communist-dominated government, rather than to us. Serban Voinea, the chief spokesman abroad of these pseudo-Socialists, had the effrontery to tell the COMISCO delegates that the schism of 10 March 1946 was made with the assent of Titel Petrescu, for the tactical reason that it would allow us to fight the Communists both from the opposition and from within the government. This statement was learned only in 1947, on the occasion of the visit to Rumania of Philip Morgan, then Secretary General of the British Labor Party.

24. "The government refusing us passports, none of us was able to attend the COMISCO conferences. Our first direct contact with the Socialist parties of the West had to wait until Ion Zissu was able to flee from Rumania, in July 1947. Information given by Zissu concerning the situation of our Party, the manner in which the elections had been held, and the part played by certain of our former comrades encountered a certain amount of skepticism. Even at that late date, the methods used by the Communist Party seemed utterly unbelievable.
25. "On leaving Rumania Zissu had been given the mission to inform the Socialist Parties abroad of what was happening in that country and to secure the expulsion from COMISCO of those who had destroyed our Party and handed the remnants to the Communists. The obvious consequence would have been to accept us in their stead, an action that Zissu was empowered to request.
26. "Legally the situation was thoroughly clear; the governmental faction of the Social-Democratic Party had lost its standing as an individual party. Amalgamating with the Communists, it had ceased to exist. No other Socialist Party except the Independent Socialists existed in Rumania.
27. "The COMISCO conference, held in Vienna in June 1948 decided to unseat those who had abandoned independent existence as a party. Thus the place of Rumania became vacant. However, the conference failed to take any decision concerning any other Rumanian representation.
28. "It was not long before refugee members of the Rumanian Independent Social-Democratic Party were joined in exile by persons belonging to the faction that had united with the Communist Party. The greater number of these declared they had been mistaken in their action and protested their good faith. They admitted that we had had a clearer understanding of events. The regime in Rumania had become so unbearable that they had been obliged to flee abroad, and almost all of them expressed the wish to join the ranks of the resistance movement with the Independent Social-Democrats.
29. "But the information we received from home to the effect that the government was sending abroad a number of agents posing as refugees made us cautious. The name of at least one member of the faction that had joined with the Communists should be mentioned. He is Eftimie Gherman, formerly a Deputy, and Secretary of the Miner's Union. We were unable to accept his offer to cooperate with us without prior approval from our Party headquarters at home, for the following reasons:
 - a. Against the wish of the Party, Eftimie Gherman had agreed to be a candidate for the puppet parliament of Carol's time, on the lists of the so-called National Renaissance Front, and had been elected.
 - b. When our Party was split on 10 March 1945, he remained in the governmental faction with those who supported the Communists.
30. "The seriousness of this record must be gauged in the light of the following:
 - a. The National Renaissance Front was the personal creation of King Carol.
 - b. It was a sole authorized party, enjoying under the existing conditions the same position as the Nazi Party in the Third Reich or the Communist Party in the Soviet Union.

- c. It instituted press censorship in the country.
- d. It dissolved all other political parties, including the Social-Democrats.
- e. It forbade all public meetings.
- f. It took voting rights from the Jews, introducing racial discrimination.
- g. Its members were required to wear a blue uniform, after the Fascist model.

And as for having remained in the Communist camp after the congress of 1946, this was assuredly a most serious act, taking into consideration the Communists' occupation forces of the Soviet Union.

31. "All these things notwithstanding, in our desire to unite all Rumanian forces abroad for a joint resistance struggle, we advised Gherman to write a letter to our president, explaining his past actions and requesting permission to join us again. Written toward the end of April 1948, that letter was entrusted to Zissu for forwarding. But it proved impossible to forward the document, because we were informed toward the beginning of the following month that our president, Titel Petrescu, and our political general secretary, Adrian Dimitriu, had been arrested by the Communist police, and so our plan was worthless. It is interesting to note that the letter contained the following sentences: 'Had I been able to see you before leaving, your distrust would have been clarified' and 'Please let me know whether or not I am accepted in the party.' In other words, Eftimie Gherman admitted that our president distrusted him, and that he was not a member of the Independent Social-Democratic Party in 1948, but requested to be admitted to membership at that date while he was in Paris. In view of the impossibility of receiving a reply, the matter remained unsolved.
32. "On 20 May 1948, Zissu was informed that Gherman had joined forces with Serban Voinea, whose record has been exposed above, and with whom he had cooperated in the Socialist faction that had joined the Communists and whose electoral campaign in the district Caras he had supported. They set up in Paris a so-called Rumanian Social-Democratic group, and issued a statement and program that said in part:
- 'Faithful to the traditions of Rumanian Socialism, the Rumanian refugee Social-Democrats meeting in Paris declare that they refuse to collaborate in any way with Rumanian reactionary groups abroad whose governments have always persecuted the labor movement, and who, in collaboration with the Iron Guard, are preparing a restoration of the old oligarchical and monarchical regime, basing their hope and actions entirely upon a war against our country.'
- Stated in no uncertain terms, this declaration makes the stand of Eftimie Gherman unequivocally clear. On one hand, he refused a collaboration that, incidentally, had never been proposed to him by anyone. On the other hand, he came out both against the monarchy and against a war of liberation.
33. "The group described above, once constituted, Serban Voinea hastened to request its admission to the COMISCO.
34. "Toward the end of 1948, outmaneuvered by his unscrupulous associates, Eftimie Gherman retired from this group. Whereupon he set up yet another group, which, to everyone's amazement, he had the effrontery to call 'The Independent Social-Democratic Party.'
35. "More amazing still, COMISCO, in its desire to group together all Rumanian Socialist forces abroad, set up in Paris, at the beginning of 1949, a mediation commission to study the means of achieving this end. To this commission Gherman stated that he possessed a letter (which he never exhibited, however) received by him from Rumania, authorizing him, Gabriel Badarau and Sacha Volman, to represent the Independent Social-Democratic Party abroad. He alleged that this letter was dated 4 January 1949.

36. "Before the mediation commission, we ourselves stated that we presented ourselves to that body purely in deference to the COMISCO, but that we had not the slightest intention of collaborating with a group of people who had betrayed the independence of the party by collaborating with the Communists. As for Gherman's pretense to represent the Independent Social-Democratic Party, we stated that we considered him to be an imposter. Obviously enough, after 8 May 1948, when the president, the political secretary general, and most of the members of the Executive Committee had been arrested, there was no one left in the Party, still at large, who was in any way qualified to issue such delegations or authorizations on behalf of the Party. As a matter of fact, after that date there was no statutory body left that could meet or take decisions freely.
37. "We further pointed out that any written delegation the Gherman group may have possessed must have been issued at a time when the party leadership could still meet, and that, in any event, a delegation can very well be terminated and the delegate deprived of its benefits. In such a case, the delegation would be transferred to some other members of the party, but in no conceivable circumstance to a notorious adversary who had never belonged to the organization.
38. "On the other hand, even lacking any documents of this sort, Zissu, in his capacity as a member of the Central Committee of the Party, as organization chairman, as one who had headed the lists in parliamentary elections, and as one around whom stood grouped all members of the Independent Social-Democrat Party abroad without exception (including organization chairmen, delegates to various congresses, parliamentary candidates and ministerial counsellors), many of whom had spent months in jail, was fully qualified to represent the Rumanian Independent Social-Democrat Party.
39. "The mediation commission, in view of the above, decided to reject the request of the Gherman group.
40. "The sub-committee of the COMISCO, firmly resolved to achieve unity among Rumanian Socialists abroad, nevertheless referred all three requests for admission, namely, those of Zissu, Gherman, and Voinea, to the conference.
41. "The plenary conference, meeting in Bern in 1949, decided to admit the Rumanian Socialists on condition that they unite.
42. "This point of view and the pressures exerted by other Socialists we counter as follows:
 - a. We do indeed represent a free and independent party which, at the proper time, through democratic and legal means, prior to its forcible dissolution, had designated its authorized representative abroad.
 - b. The other two groups do not represent any existing political organization in Rumania, seeing that the governmental faction had dissolved itself of its own volition in joining the Communists.
 - c. Even though others might claim to speak on behalf of that faction, they have no qualifications to do so.
 - d. It is impossible to place on an equal standing with a party organization inside Rumania insignificant groups set up abroad that have no ties at home.
 - e. Serban Voinea and Eftimie Gherman, through their actions, stand accused before our country of such grievous offenses that any association with them must necessarily mean compromising ourselves forever.

- f. Their collaboration with the Communists and the fusion brought about by them while the country was under Soviet military occupation can be considered only as an understanding with the occupying Power.
 - g. Hence they have yet to answer for their treason, and we who are abroad have no capacity either to absolve or to forgive them, such an event resting with the people who are to this day suffering and dying in Soviet jails and camps as a result of their betrayal.
 - h. In any event, before any appeal is made to our indulgence, we demand that justice be done to ourselves.
 - i. We have no intention of repeating the experience at home, where we had occasion to see that these men supported the dissolving element in our Party, and proved themselves utterly untrustworthy, or to receive them again in our midst.
 - j. A mere grouping of numbers, as the COMISCO seems to wish, does not in any way strengthen the Socialist movement. On the contrary, only a selection of tested elements, people with clear-cut views and a firm position, can lead to a homogeneous and strong organization.
 - k. Once and for all, we are firmly resolved to enthrone morality in our public life. This means that all who have displayed bad faith and opportunism and who have played the game of the Communists, hence, by implication that of the occupying power, must bear the consequences of their actions. We cannot countenance impunity for offenses of a public nature.
 - l. The COMISCO cannot encourage those who have trampled on its own basic principles, the principles of democratic socialism, while a man like Titel Petrescu, who has defended those principles at the price of his personal liberty, is in jail.
 - m. At the present time, when we desire more than ever to join our efforts with those of various international bodies, with a view of restoring democratic life in our own country, we cannot conceivably do so by promoting men whose record stands for the precise opposite.
43. "Such is our stand, such the positions we have no intention to abandon. Our views are shared by a number of Socialist Parties, members of the COMISCO. Of these we cite in the first place the Socialist Party of Italian Labor (Saragat), which, in its publication Umanita, published in a series of articles an interview with Ion Zissu. The German Social Democrat Party in addition to the reports published in Neue Vorwart, adopted a resolution in this sense in its Executive Committee. Reports received from the Socialist Parties of Austria, Belgium, and Holland indicate that they too will adopt a similar point of view.
44. "The issue is on the agenda of the COMISCO Conference that will take place in Strasbourg during September, 1950. This conference will have to decide whether the solution adopted in Bern, with which we do not agree, is to be maintained, or whether, in the light of the Vienna decision, which decided on the elimination of all Communist and dubious elements, it is to be reversed.
45. "Whatever the outcome, we stand fully convinced that the last word in this issue will reside with our country, once it is liberated. We shall make no compromise, but trust that no international organization, zealous like ourselves to respect the liberty, the independence, and the right of self-determination of others, will see fit to infringe a decision that rests with the Rumanian people."